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Sensorimotor control is thought to rely on predictive internal models in order to cope
efficiently with uncertain environments. Recently, it has been shown that humans not
only learn different internal models for different tasks, but that they also extract common
structure between tasks. This raises the question of how the motor system selects
between different structures or models, when each model can be associated with a range
of different task-specific parameters. Here we design a sensorimotor task that requires
subjects to compensate visuomotor shifts in a three-dimensional virtual reality setup,
where one of the dimensions can be mapped to a model variable and the other dimension
to the parameter variable. By introducing probe trials that are neutral in the parameter
dimension, we can directly test for model selection. We found that model selection
procedures based on Bayesian statistics provided a better explanation for subjects’ choice
behavior than simple non-probabilistic heuristics. Our experimental design lends itself to
the general study of model selection in a sensorimotor context as it allows to separately
query model and parameter variables from subjects.
Keywords: Bayesian model selection, sensorimotor control, structural learning, hierarchical learning, sensorimotor
integration
INTRODUCTION
For biological organisms in uncertain environments, at least three
important problems arise: one, the estimation of the state from
noisy sensory feedback (e.g., the state of body parts). Two, the
prediction of sensory consequences of actions and three, the
selection of desirable actions, which builds upon the state esti-
mate as well as the capability to predict consequences (Wolpert
and Ghahramani, 2000; Todorov, 2004; Shadmehr et al., 2010;
Franklin and Wolpert, 2011). Internal models are thought to play
a central role in solving these problems (Shadmehr and Mussa-
Ivaldi, 1994; Wolpert et al., 1995; Kawato, 1999; Tin and Poon,
2005). For estimation, internal models make use of sensory feed-
back to update prior beliefs about unobserved variables. Forward
models predict sensory consequences of one’s own actions, which
allows not only to bridge delays in the sensorimotor loop, but
also to distinguish between self- and externally generated motion
(Poulet and Hedwig, 2006; Imamizu, 2010). To solve the prob-
lem of action selection, the theory of optimal feedback control has
been used as one of a number of frameworks that study how inter-
nal models are harnessed in control (Todorov and Jordan, 2002;
Diedrichsen, 2007; Chen-Harris et al., 2008; Izawa et al., 2008;
Braun et al., 2009a; Diedrichsen and Dowling, 2009; Nagengast
et al., 2009).
Besides the question of how biological organisms adapt inter-
nal models when the environment changes over time, another
important question is how they learn new internal models and
select between existing models (Shadmehr et al., 2010). There
is a large body of evidence that shows that learning of predic-
tive models happens on many different time scales and levels
of abstraction (Newell et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2006; Wolpert
and Flanagan, 2010). In a number of recent studies (Braun
et al., 2009a,b) it was shown, for example, that the motor sys-
tem can learn structural invariants when faced with randomly
changing environments that share a structural similarity. In
particular, in these tasks subjects had to both adapt parame-
ters of internal models to environments with known structure
and to learn new structures and their parameters from expo-
sure to environments with different variability pattern. Here
we are interested in the mechanism by which the motor sys-
tem selects between different structures, that is the selection
between different models that can take on different parameter
settings.
In cognitive science, a number of studies has shown that
human model selection in categorization or language learning
tasks can be well described as Bayesian model selection (Holyoak,
2008; Kemp and Tenenbaum, 2008; Tenenbaum et al., 2011).
Bayesian models have also been very successful in explaining
human perceptual and sensorimotor learning of parameters in
environments with known structure (van Beers et al., 1999; Ernst
and Banks, 2002; Knill and Pouget, 2004; Körding and Wolpert,
2004; Körding and Wolpert, 2006; Braun et al., 2009a; Girshick
and Banks, 2009). However, if there are several structures, and
each structure has a range of parameter values, then the full
problem of model and parameter selection arises. For perceptual
learning this has been studied, for example, in case of the ven-
triloquist problem, where subjects have to discriminate whether
a visual and an auditory signal stem from one source or from
two different sources (Körding et al., 2007; Sato et al., 2007). Here
we study Bayesian model selection in the context of a sensorimo-
tor integration task that allows for ambiguous stimuli which are
compatible with different model classes. The goal of our study is
to develop an experimental paradigm for model selection and to
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test whether human sensorimotor choices in such a setting are
quantitatively consistent with Bayesian model selection.
RESULTS
Subjects controlled a cursor from a start position to one of two
targets in a 3D virtual reality setup—see Figure 1A. At the start
position the cursor was always displayed and represented subjects’
veridical hand position. However, during the movement a ran-
dom lateral shift s was applied to the cursor with respect to the
hand position. Importantly, throughout most of the movement,
the cursor was hidden and there was only a brief time interval of
sensory feedback of the shifted cursor position. In each trial, the
shift s was randomly sampled from one of two possible distribu-
tions with 50:50 probability. In the first part of the experiment
(first 500 trials), the two distributions were given by a Gaussian
P(s|Mσ11 ) and a mixture of Gaussians P(s|M2)—see Figure 2A.
In the second part of the experiment (last 500 trials), the stan-
dard deviation of the first distribution was increased, so that
the two distributions were given by P(s|Mσ21 ) and P(s|M2)—see
Figure 2B.
From the point of view of model selection, the two distribu-
tions over the shift correspond to two different models M1 and
M2. Subjects could indicate their choice of model by selecting
one of the two targets. Subjects could exploit the observed shift to
infer the correct target. Their belief about the shift s was reported
by a compensatory horizontal movement. In all trials, the upper
target represented the selection of model M1 and the lower target
represented the selection of model M2. After completing a reach-
ing movement, participants were informed about the correctness
of their beliefs by showing the shifted cursor and hiding the
incorrect target. Subjects were instructed about the relationship
between shift and target selection. For example, in the first part
of the study they were told that small shifts are mostly associated
with the upper target and larger shifts with the lower target—see
“Materials and Methods” for details. They could use the first 100
trials of each part of the experiment to acquaint themselves with
the decision criterion.
FIGURE 1 | Sensorimotor task setup. (A) Shows the schematic of a
standard trial. One of two targets (yellow) has to be hit after observing a
shifted cursor (red) for a short feedback duration. The white sphere depicts
the start position. (B) Illustrates a probe trial where the visual feedback is
ambiguous and consists of a densely sampled array of cursors, centered
horizontally and vertically. The target width covers the whole lateral
workspace, in order to make horizontal compensations obsolete. A
photograph of the experimental apparatus is provided in Figure 15.
To test for model selection with different degrees of feedback
uncertainty, we used probe trials where participants were shown
ambiguous feedback. The feedback presented in these trials was
an array consisting of uniformly and densely sampled rectangles
that represented all the possible cursor locations—see Figure 1B.
The array width d could take on one of three different values
with equal probability: small (d = 3 cm), medium (d = 5 cm),
and large (d = 8 cm). The larger the array the higher the uncer-
tainty about the cursor position, and therefore the higher the
uncertainty about the underlying shift s. In these probe trials
subjects only reported their belief about the model without indi-
cating the presumed shift. This was achieved by increasing the
target width to the full size of the lateral workspace, which made
horizontal compensations unnecessary. As in the standard trials,
participants reported their belief about the correct model M by
choosing either the upper or the lower target, however, in probe
trials they did not receive any feedback on whether their choice
was correct or not. Probe trials occurred intermixed with standard
trials after the first 100 trials of each part of the experiment.
In the probe trials of the first part of the experiment we
found that the probability of choosing model Mσ11 decreases
with increasing width of the ambiguous feedback array: for small
array widths subjects preferred model M1, whereas for large
ambiguous feedback arrays they preferred model M2. This can
be seen in Figure 3B. The correlation between the array width
and the choice probability was statistically significant for all
subjects (p < 0.01, Fisher’s exact test). For the second part of the
experiment, subjects’ model selection probabilities are depicted
in Figure 3C. The correlation between array width and choice
probability was no longer significant (p > 0.1 for all subjects,
Fisher’s exact test). This is because, for ambiguous feedback arrays
with medium and large uncertainty (d = 5, 8 cm) subjects were
now indifferent between model M1 and M2. Importantly, when
comparing the model selection probabilities of the first part of
the experiment and the second part of the experiment shown
in Figure 3A, the model selection probabilities changed signifi-
cantly (p < 0.05, ranksum test) for ambiguous stimuli with large
uncertainty (d = 8 cm). For an array width of d = 3 or 5 cm
there was no significant change in the choice probabilities for the
two variance conditions of model M1 (p > 0.05 ranksum test).
Importantly, this implies that the choice probabilities of select-
ing modelM2 are very different for the same stimulus (d = 8 cm)
depending on the complexity of model M1.
We tested five different explanatory schemes to describe sub-
jects’ choice behaviors: model selection with Bayes factors, model
selection with Bayesian policy inference of the discrimination
functions learned in the standard trials, and three heuristic expla-
nations that are non-probabilistic.
EXPLANATION 1: BAYES FACTORS
Given prior probability P(Mi) over the two models M1 and
M2, Bayes’ rule describes how to assign posterior probability
P(Mi|d) after observing array width d in a probe trial, such that
P(Mi|d) ∝ P(d|Mi)P(Mi)—where P(d|Mi) measures how well
the array width d can be explained on average by the shifts
that are compatible with model class Mi. This average is also
called the marginal likelihood or evidence and can be computed as
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 291 | 2
Genewein and Braun A sensorimotor paradigm for Bayesian model selection
FIGURE 2 | Prior distributions for the horizontal shift s. (A) Shows the
two prior distributions induced by model Mσ11 (Gaussian distribution with
σ1 = 1, solid line) and M2 (mixture of two Gaussians, dashed line) in the first
part of the study. (B) Shows the two prior distributions induced by model
Mσ21 (Gaussian distribution with σ1 = 4, dash-dot line) and M2 (same mixture
of two Gaussians, dashed line) in the second part of the study.
FIGURE 3 | Subjects’ choice behavior in probe trials. (A) Shows the
average of the experimentally observed choice probabilities for choosing M1
for three different observed array widths d of the ambiguous feedback array.
The mean is taken over all subjects. The solid line corresponds to the choice
probabilities observed in the first part of the study, the dash-dot line shows
the choice probabilities observed in the second part of the study, where the
variance of M1 was increased. (B) Shows the experimentally observed
probability of choosing Mσ11 . Circles represent individual subjects’ choice
probabilities, the solid line shows the average over participants with standard
deviation error bars. With increasing array size, the probability of choosing
Mσ11 decreases. (C) Shows the experimentally observed choice probabilities
P (Mσ21 |d) for the second part of the experiment, where σ2 > σ1. Compared to




dsP(d|s,Mi)P(s|Mi), where each shift s contributes
the likelihood P(d|s,Mi) weighted by the prior P(s|Mi) shown
in Figure 2. P(d|s,M) is an observation model that explains how
likely it is to observe an array of width d if the true shift is s. In
our experiment both models have the same observation model,
that is P(d|s,M) = P(d|s), which assigns equal probability to all
array widths d greater or equal than a given shift s up to a max-
imum width dmax. This uniform distribution over d can be seen
in Figure 4A for different given shifts s. When P(d|s) is used as a
likelihood model, however, it is considered as a function of s with
a particular fixed observation d. The likelihood model then indi-
cates how likely all the different shifts swould be as an explanation
of the observed array width d. The likelihood model as a function
of s can be seen in Figure 4B.
Based on the likelihood model in Figure 4B and the priors
shown in Figure 2, Figure 5 explains how the model evidence
can be computed for different observations d. Figure 6 shows the
model evidence for the different widths d of the ambiguous feed-
back array for all three models Mσ11 , M
σ2
1 , and M2. As can be
seen in the bottom row of Figure 6, for small width (d = 3 cm)
of the ambiguous stimulus array, the evidence for M1 (for both
σ1 and σ2) is higher than for M2. This is because model M1
places a high probability mass on small shifts centered around
zero, whereas model M2 does not—see Figure 2. For ambiguous
feedback arrays of medium uncertainty (array width d = 5 cm),
the evidence of all models is very similar, that means they all can
explain a medium-size range of possible shifts equally well. For
ambiguous feedback arrays with large uncertainty (array width
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d = 8 cm), the evidence of Mσ11 is lower than the evidence for
M2, because model M2 places more probability mass on larger
feedback array widths, which ultimately results from the higher
probability placed on large shifts—see Figure 6. However, when
the standard deviation of model M1 is increased to σ2 in the
second part of the study, both models can explain ambiguous
feedback with large uncertainty equally well.
Once we have computed the model evidence for all possi-
ble observations and models, we can use it to make predictions
about subjects’ choice probabilities between the models. As we
have equal prior probabilities P(Mi) for the models in our experi-
ment, themodel classMi that assigns a higher marginal likelihood
P(d|Mi) to the observation d is predicted to be preferred. Model
selection is then determined by the Bayes factor (Kass and Raftery,
1993) between the two models, that is P(d|M1)/P(d|M2). Based
on a softmax decision rule, we can then predict subjects’ choice
probabilities as
P(a = M1) = 1




where a = M1 implies moving up to choose model M1 and a =
M2 implies moving down to choose model M2. We assumed
α = 1 throughout. Thus, if the Bayes factor is larger than one,
subjects should be more likely to choose Model 1. Conversely,
if the Bayes factor is smaller than one, subjects should be more
likely to choose Model 2. The choice probabilities resulting from
the softmax rule are shown in Figure 7A. In the case of small
variance σ1, this predicts that the probability of choosing model
M1 should decrease with the increase of the uncertainty of the
ambiguous feedback. In the case of large variance σ2, this predicts
that the probability of choosing model M1 is very similar to the
probability of choosing modelM2 for medium and large feedback
arrays. Especially for the large ambiguous feedback array of width
FIGURE 5 | Computation of the model evidence P(d|M) when
observing an ambiguous cursor array of width d—shown for model
Mσ11 and d = 5, so the possible shifts of the hand position range from
−2.5 to 2.5 cm. (A) Shows the likelihood P (d = 5|s) of observing the
ambiguous cursor array of width d = 5 for different shifts s. (B) Shows the
prior P (s|Mσ11 ) over the shift s according to model Mσ11 . (C) Depicts the
product of the distributions in panels (A,B) and illustrates the integration
over the shifts s. This computation leads to a single value for the model
evidence P (d|Mσ11 ). The model evidence can be similarly computed for all
models as shown in the inlet panel.
FIGURE 4 | Observation model. (A) Shows the probability P (d|s) of
observing an array of width d given the shift s. All array widths up
to a maximum dmax have equal probabilities but arrays that are too
small to contain the shift s have zero probability. The figure shows
three different cases for three different shifts s with a solid line
and two dashed lines, respectively. It is important to notice that in
case of small shifts probability mass is spread quite evenly, whereas
in the case of large shifts most of the probability mass is placed
close to the maximum array width dmax. (B) Shows the likelihood
P (d|s) as a function of s. For an array width d it is more likely
that the shift s that caused the observation is close to half the
array width d/2.
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FIGURE 6 | The 3 × 3 panel shows the product of parameter prior
P(s|M) and observation likelihood P(d|s) for the three possible
array widths d∈ {3, 5 ,8} cm and the three different models Mσ 11
(black), Mσ21 (dark gray) and M2 (light gray). The bottom row
shows the model evidence P (d|M) of observing a feedback array of
width d for the different models, which is obtained by integrating out
the shift s for each of the three models within the same column. For
feedback arrays of large width (d = 8 cm), model M2 is a better
explanation than model Mσ11 . However, when increasing the standard
deviation of M1 to σ2 both models have similar marginal likelihood for
large width. For a detailed illustration on the computation of the model
evidence P (d|M) see Figure 5.
d = 8 cm—the prediction implies that for the same stimulus the
choice probabilities for selecting model M2 are very different
depending on the complexity of model M1.
The comparison to the actual probabilities of model selec-
tion observed in the experiment are presented in Figures 7B,C.
In line with the predictions shown in Figure 7A the probability
of choosing model Mσ11 decreases with increasing width of the
ambiguous feedback array for the first part of the experiment: for
small array widths subjects preferred modelM1, whereas for large
ambiguous feedback arrays they preferred model M2. Similarly,
the predictions explain the choice probabilities of the probe trials
in the second part of the experiment, where for small array widths
model M1 is preferred, and for larger array widths subjects are
indifferent between the two models. The predictions achieved a
negative log-likelihood of L = 1170 with respect to the data.
EXPLANATION 2: BAYESIAN POLICY INFERENCE
Instead of learning different prior distributions P(s|Mi) over the
shifts for the two models M1 and M2, subjects could directly
learn optimal responses P(a = M1|s) to the shifts in the stan-
dard trials and a single prior P(s) over the possible shifts. They
could learn, for example, that for small shifts they should mostly
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 291 | 5
Genewein and Braun A sensorimotor paradigm for Bayesian model selection
FIGURE 7 | Predictions and data: Bayes factors. (A) Shows the
predicted choice probabilities for choosing M1 as a function of the
observed array width d under the assumption of a softmax choice rule.
The solid line corresponds to the predicted choice probabilities for the
first part of the study, the dash-dot line shows the predicted choice
probabilities for the second part of the study, where the variance of
M1 was increased. (B) Shows the predictions for the first part of the
study (solid line) and the experimental results for three different widths
d of the ambiguous feedback array. The dotted line shows the mean
and standard deviation across subjects of the experimentally observed
probabilities of choosing Mσ11 . (C) Shows the predictions (dash-dot line)
as well as the experimentally observed choice probabilities (dotted line
represents mean with standard deviation error bars across subjects) for
choosing Mσ21 in the second part of the study.
move to the upper target, that is a = M1, and for large shifts they
should mostly move to the lower target, that is a = M2. When
faced with an ambiguous stimulus in a probe trial, they could
then integrate over the responses P(a|s) by considering all possible
shifts weighted by the plausibility of each shift. This plausibility is
given by the posterior distribution P(s|d) that results from infer-
ring the underlying shift after observing an array of width d. The
choice probability in the probe trial can then be computed by
the integral
P(a = M1|d) =
∫
ds P(s|d)P(a = M1|s).
This choice rule has been previously proposed as a stochastic
Bayesian rule for control in (Ortega and Braun, 2010) to solve
adaptive control problems. In this framework it is assumed that
a number of primitive strategies are known that are suitable for
different environments. When knowledge of the environment is
not available a probabilistic superposition of the primitive strate-
gies results in a stochastic strategy that conforms with Bayesian
statistics. In our experiment the different environments corre-
spond to trials with different shifts. The basic strategies coping
with these shifts could be learned in the standard trials together
with a prior P(s) over all possible shifts. The unconditional prior
P(s) is given by the superposition of the two conditional pri-
ors shown in Figure 2, that is P(s) = 12P(s|M1) + 12P(s|M2). In
the probe trials ambiguity is induced about the underlying shift.
The possible underlying shifts can be inferred through the pos-
terior P(s|d) that is given by P(s|d) ∝ P(d|s)P(s), with the same
likelihood model P(d|s) as described in the previous section and
displayed in Figure 4B.
To test this model, we first investigated subjects’ choice
behavior in standard trials. In particular, we examined sub-
jects’ probability P(a = M1|s) of choosing model M1 or M2 for
different shifts s. The response curves P(a = M1|s) for a typi-
cal subject can be seen in Figures 8A,B. Panel (A) shows the
response curve for the first part of the experiment, and Panel
(B) shows the response curve for the second part of the exper-
iment. In both cases subjects showed a high probability for
choosing model M1 for small shifts. In the first part of the
experiment this probability decreases for large shifts, implying
the selection of model M2. In the second part of the experi-
ment the probability of selecting model M1 decreases for larger
shifts, but then increases again with very large shifts. These
response curves are in agreement with the prior distributions
shown in Figure 3, as in the first part of the experiment model
M1 was only associated with small shifts, whereas in the sec-
ond part of the experiment model M1 could also be associated
with very large shifts. Learning the response functions P(a =
M1|s) is therefore equivalent to learning the conditional priors
P(s|Mi). The fitted response curves for all subjects can be seen
in Figure 9.
In the probe trials the underlying shift is unknown and there-
fore the policy P(a = M1|s) cannot be applied directly, as it
requires knowledge of the shift s. Using Bayesian policy inference,
the action is then determined by a probabilistic superposition that
is weighted by the posterior probabilities of the shifts. This super-
position allows predicting directly the choice probabilities for the
probe trials. The predicted choice probabilities are shown for a
typical subject in Figures 8C,D. Panel (C) shows the subject’s pre-
dicted probability of choosing model M1 for three different array
widths d in the first part of the experiment. It can be seen that
the choice probability decreases for large observed array widths.
Similarly, Panel (D) shows the subject’s predicted probability of
choosing model M1 in the second part of the experiment. In this
case the choice probability for model M1 is elevated for the small
array width, but is close to one half for the two larger array sizes.
The comparison to the actual choice probabilities of all subjects
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FIGURE 8 | Construction of predicted choice probabilities following
Bayesian policy inference. (A) Shows the fitted choice probabilities of
selecting model M1 in standard trials when the shift s is known for a
typical subject in the first part of the experiment. Model M1 is mostly
selected for small shifts. (B) Shows same as panel (A) but for the
second part of the experiment. (C,D) Show the predicted choice
probability of selecting model M1 for this subject in a probe trial with
observed array width d. The probe trial choice probabilities are obtained
by a probabilistic superposition of the standard trial choice probabilities
shown in panels (A,B).
observed in the experiment are presented in Figure 10. The pre-
dictions achieved a total negative log-likelihood of L = 1097 with
respect to the data.
EXPLANATION 3: THE “AVERAGE SHIFT”-HEURISTIC
The response curves P(a|s), that describe behavior in the stan-
dard trials in dependence of the observed shift s, could also
be used for non-probabilistic heuristic strategies in probe tri-
als. One such strategy could be to simply assume the average
shift when faced with an ambiguous stimulus, which corresponds
to the location in the middle of the cursor array in the probe
trial—see Figures 11A,B. In this case the choice probabilities are
determined by
P(a = M1|d) = P(a = M1|s = 0).
However, this strategy predicts constant choice probabilities that
do not vary with the observed array size. Moreover, this predicts
that subjects should choose model M1 most of the time, as it
explains shifts in the middle best—see the prediction for a typical
subject in Figures 11C,D. This prediction is in clear contradiction
to the observed choice probabilities that change depending on
the feedback array width. Figure 12 shows the predictions of the
“average shift”-heuristic compared to the actual choice probabili-
ties of all subjects. The predictions of the “average shift”-heuristic
achieved a total negative log-likelihood of L = 2689 with respect
to the data.
EXPLANATION 4: THE “BIGGEST SHIFT”-HEURISTIC
Another non-probabilistic heuristic that could be employed based
on the response curves of the standard trials, is to assume always
the largest possible shift for any given cursor array in the probe
trial. Accordingly, the location of the assumed shift would cor-
respond to the edge of the array with total width d, such that
the edge corresponds to the half-width d/2. The corresponding
choice probabilities are determined by
P(a = M1|d) = P(a = M1|s = d/2).
The predictions of the “biggest shift”-heuristic can be seen in
Figures 11E,F for a typical subject. As in the two Bayesian mod-
els, the predicted choice probability of model M1 decreases with
increasing array width for the first part of the experiment. For the
second part of the experiment the “biggest shift”-heuristic pre-
dicts a slightly increased probability of choosing model M1 for
the small array width and almost indifferent choice probabilities
for the two larger array widths. Figure 13 shows the actual choice
probabilities of all subjects compared to the predictions. While
the “biggest shift”-heuristic predicts the right trend in the first
part of the experiments, it considerably underestimates the actual
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FIGURE 9 | (A–G) Show the fitted standard trial choice probabilities of
selecting model M1 for all seven subjects. The left panel shows performance
during the first part of the experiment and the right panel shows performance
during the second part of the experiment. In each panel, the filled circles show
the subject’s mean choice probability P (Mσ1 ), given a particular shift s along
with standard deviation error bars. The choice probabilities for negative shifts
have been mapped to the corresponding positive shift. The dotted line shows
the fitted response curve that lies closest to the observed choice probabilities.
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FIGURE 10 | Predictions and data: Bayesian policy inference. (A) Shows
the predicted choice probabilities for choosing M1 as a function of the
observed array width d using response functions that have been fitted to
the standard trial data. The solid line corresponds to the predicted choice
probabilities for the first part of the study, the dash-dot line shows the
predicted choice probabilities for the second part of the study, where the
variance of M1 was increased. Since the response functions have been
fitted individually per subject, the predictions show the mean across all
subjects. The corresponding standard deviation error bars are shown in
panels (B,C). (B) Shows the predictions for the first part of the study (solid
line) and the experimental results for three different widths d of the
ambiguous feedback array. The dotted line shows the mean and standard
deviation across subjects of the experimentally observed probabilities of
choosing Mσ11 . (C) Shows the predictions (dash-dot line) as well as the
experimentally observed choice probabilities (dotted line) for choosing Mσ21
in the second part of the study.
choice probabilities. The predictions for the second part of the
experiment lie within the standard deviation of the experimental
data. The predictions of the “biggest shift”-heuristic achieved a
total negative log-likelihood of L = 1321 with respect to the data.
EXPLANATION 5: THE “HALFWAY SHIFT”-HEURISTIC
The probe trial shifts are grossly underestimated by the “average
shift”-heuristic and overestimated by the “biggest shift”-heuristic.
Accordingly the choice probabilities for model M1 are either too
high or too low, especially in the first part of the experiment.
We therefore considered a “halfway shift”-heuristic that would
always assume a shift halfway between the middle and the edge
of the cursor array. Accordingly, the choice probabilities of the
“halfway shift”-heuristic lie inbetween the extremes of the other
two heuristics
P(a = M1|d) = P(a = M1|s = d/4).
Figure 14 shows the actual choice probabilities of all subjects
compared to the predictions of the “halfway shift”-heuristic.
While the error bars of the experimental data and the theoretical
curves overlap, it can be seen that the heuristic generally overes-
timates the choice probability of choosing model M1. The pre-
dictions of the “halfway shift”-heuristic achieved a total negative
log-likelihood of L = 1203 with respect to the data.
DISCUSSION
We designed a three-dimensional visuomotor integration exper-
iment where we could distinguish between parameter variables
and model variables, such that the parameter variable was rep-
resented by lateral visuomotor shifts in one dimension and the
model variable was represented by two targets in the other
dimension that were associated with different distributions over
the shifts. In particular, we designed probe trials that did not
require subjects to compensate these shifts, such that the shift
variable could be “integrated out” when they reported their belief
about the underlyingmodel class. This allowed us to directly com-
pare subjects’ choice probabilities to the selection probabilities
predicted by five different schemes of model selection: Bayesian
model selection based on Bayes factors, Bayesian policy infer-
ence over response curves that were fitted to the standard trials,
and three non-probabilistic heuristics that were also based on the
standard trial response curves. We found that the Bayesian model
selection procedures explained our data best, whereas the three
heuristics were worse in explaining choice behavior in the probe
trials. By testing two sets of distributions over the shifts, for which
the observed model selection probabilities agreed with the pre-
dictions of two different Bayesian model selection procedures, we
achieved a proof of concept for this experimental paradigm.
The experimental paradigm differs from previous sensorimo-
tor paradigms on Bayesian integration (Körding and Wolpert,
2004) in two important ways. First, by introducing a third dimen-
sion to the task we can simultaneously induce uncertainty over
two random variables, one of which can represent a parameter
variable and the other one a model variable. Previous studies
(Körding and Wolpert, 2004) have shown Bayesian integration
in visuomotor tasks where only uncertainty over parameters
was investigated, meaning that subjects had to infer visuomo-
tor shifts which were drawn from a particular distribution. It
was shown that subjects combined information about the prior
distribution of these shifts together with noisy sensory feedback
in order to obtain an optimal estimate of the shift. By vary-
ing the reliability of the sensory feedback, the authors could
show that subjects weighted prior and feedback in a Bayesian
way—giving less weight to the feedback if reliability of the
feedback was low. As there was only one distribution over
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FIGURE 11 | Construction of predicted choice probabilities following
heuristics. (A,B) Show the fitted choice probabilities of selecting model
M1 in standard trials of the same subject shown in Figure 8. For the
“average shift”-heuristic the shift s0 is always assumed in the probe
trials. For the “biggest shift”-heuristic the shift is always assumed to
be the largest possible shift that depends on the width of the feedback
array and ranges from s3 to s8. (C,D) Show the predicted choice
probability of selecting model M1 for this subject in a probe trial with
observed array width d under the “average shift”-heuristic. (E,F) Show
the predicted choice probability of selecting model M1 for this subject
in a probe trial with observed array width d under the “biggest
shift”-heuristic.
shifts, the authors could not test for Bayesian model selection
in their experiment. By introducing the third dimension for
the model variable, we could therefore naturally extend their
paradigm.
Second, we developed a paradigm where we can separately
query the model and parameter variables from subjects. We
achieved this by enlarging the horizontal size of the targets in
probe trials, such that lateral corrections, that are used to report
the shift parameter, become obsolete. Moreover, we clamped
horizontal movements in probe trials with a force channel to
ensure that only the model variable is reported. These pre-
cautions are necessary, in particular if we assume that sub-
jects report maximum a posteriori estimates, because the max-
imum of a joint distribution maxs,M P(s,M|d) is not neces-
sarily the same as the maximum of the marginal distribution
maxM
∑
s P(s,M|d). This asymmetry is one of the most impor-
tant problems when designing a sensorimotor paradigm for
model selection, in which the model variable has to be queried
non-verbally.
As subjects were instructed verbally at the beginning of the
experiment about the relationship between the cursor shifts and
the two targets, the question arises in how far cognitive processes
might have played a role during the experiment. We instructed
subjects about the cursor-target relationship to speed up and sim-
plify the learning process, as we were not primarily interested in
standard trial performance, but in probe trial behavior. Subjects
could use these instructions as a good first guess to discriminate
between the two targets. Importantly, the verbal instructions rel-
evant for standard trials did not eliminate any of the ambiguity
faced in probe trials that needed to be resolved during the move-
ment. In this sense, our task can be conceived as a generalization
of previous sensorimotor tasks (Körding and Wolpert, 2004).
Nevertheless we cannot rule out that cognitive processes played a
role in the perception of the ambiguous stimuli during the probe
trials and the subsequent discrimination between the two mod-
els, as cognitive and sensorimotor processes are often intertwined.
However, even cognitive processes have been previously shown to
be consistent with Bayesian inference.
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FIGURE 12 | Predictions and data: “average shift”-heuristic. (A) Shows
the predicted choice probabilities for choosing M1, assuming that subjects
base their decision on the average shift when observing an array of width d.
The predictions are based on response functions that have been fitted to the
standard trial data. The solid line corresponds to the predicted choice
probabilities for the first part of the study, the dash-dot line shows the
predicted choice probabilities for the second part of the study, where the
variance of M1 was increased. Since the response functions have been fitted
individually per subject, the predictions show the mean across all subjects.
The corresponding standard deviation error bars are shown in panels (B,C).
(B) Shows the predictions for the first part of the study (solid line) and the
experimental results for three different widths d of the ambiguous feedback
array. The dotted line shows the mean and standard deviation across subjects
of the experimentally observed probabilities of choosing Mσ11 . (C) Shows the
predictions (dash-dot line) as well as the experimentally observed choice
probabilities (dotted line) for choosing Mσ21 in the second part of the study.
FIGURE 13 | Predictions and data: “biggest shift”-heuristic. (A)
Shows the predicted choice probabilities for choosing M1, assuming
that subjects base their decision on a shift equal to the largest value
that lies within the array of width d. The predictions are based on
response functions that have been fitted to the standard trial data. The
solid line corresponds to the predicted choice probabilities for the first
part of the study, the dash-dot line shows the predicted choice
probabilities for the second part of the study, where the variance of
M1 was increased. Since the response functions have been fitted
individually per subject, the predictions show the mean across all
subjects. The corresponding standard deviation error bars are shown in
panels (B,C). (B) Shows the predictions for the first part of the study
(solid line) and the experimental results for three different widths d of
the ambiguous feedback array. The dotted line shows the mean and
standard deviation across subjects of the experimentally observed
probabilities of choosing Mσ11 . (C) Shows the predictions (dash-dot line)
as well as the experimentally observed choice probabilities (dotted line)
for choosing Mσ21 in the second part of the study.
In cognitive science and perceptual learning hierarchical
Bayesian inference over model classes and model parameters has
been previously investigated in a number of studies (Tenenbaum
et al., 2006; Körding et al., 2007; Sato et al., 2007; Holyoak, 2008;
Kemp and Tenenbaum, 2008, 2009; Tenenbaum et al., 2011) In
particular, (Körding et al., 2007) have studied integration vs.
segregation of audio-visual stimuli in human subjects—which
included inference over the two models M1 and M2: (M1) there
is only one source for both stimuli with a location parameter
s and (M2) there are two different sources for the two stimuli
with location parameters svisual and saudio. To specifically look
into the probabilities of model selection they modeled data from
a similar previous experiment (Wallace et al., 2004), where sub-
jects were asked to report their perception of unity. In contrast,
our experimental paradigm allows for reporting model selection
without the need of explicitly asking subjects verbally and with-
out them being aware that one of the task dimensions represents
a parameter variable and the other a model variable.
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FIGURE 14 | Predictions and data: “halfway shift”-heuristic. (A)
Shows the predicted choice probabilities for choosing M1, assuming
that subjects base their decision on a shift equal to half of the largest
value that lies within the array of width d. The predictions are based
on response functions that have been fitted to the standard trial data.
The solid line corresponds to the predicted choice probabilities for the
first part of the study, the dash-dot line shows the predicted choice
probabilities for the second part of the study, where the variance of
M1 was increased. Since the response functions have been fitted
individually per subject, the predictions show the mean across all
subjects. The corresponding standard deviation error bars are shown in
panels (B,C). (B) Shows the predictions for the first part of the study
(solid line) and the experimental results for three different widths d of
the ambiguous feedback array. The dotted line shows the mean and
standard deviation across subjects of the experimentally observed
probabilities of choosing Mσ11 . (C) Shows the predictions (dash-dot line)
as well as the experimentally observed choice probabilities (dotted line)
for choosing Mσ21 in the second part of the study.
We compared five different strategies that could explain sub-
jects’ model selection probabilities in probe trials. The two
Bayesian explanations had the lowest negative likelihood and
therefore explained the choice probabilities in the probe tri-
als best. However, there are important differences between the
two Bayesian explanations. The first explanation explicitly com-
putes the marginal likelihoods and uses these likelihoods as
a discriminative variable. This requires the probabilistic rep-
resentation of the conditional priors P(s|M), the prior over
the models P(M), and the likelihood model P(d|s). The opti-
mal strategy is then determined over the marginal likelihood
that results from an integration of these distributions. In con-
trast, Bayesian policy inference results from a stochastic super-
position of given policies, which in our case correspond to
the model selection probabilities in standard trials when the
visuomotor shift is known. In probe trials, the model selec-
tion probabilities can then be determined by an integral over
these standard trial policies. If subjects’ choice behavior was
non-stochastic we could easily distinguish between these two pos-
sibilities, as decisions based on the marginal likelihood bear no
intrinsic stochasticity—we imposed it here through the softmax-
function—and decisions resulting from the probabilistic super-
position of standard trial policies would always be stochastic.
Given the error bars on our data and the fact that real decision-
making processes are always somewhat noisy, it is hard to distin-
guish between the two processes, even though the Bayesian pol-
icy inference achieved the lowest negative likelihood—compare
Figures 7, 10.
We also examined three simple heuristics and tested in how
far they might be able to explain the observed choice proba-
bilities in probe trials. We investigated heuristics that did not
consider any probabilistic representation of the task. In partic-
ular, we were investigating in how far standard trial policies could
be harnessed to construct heuristics for the probe trials. A first
heuristic assumed that subjects would always use the standard
trial policy associated with a zero shift right in the middle of the
ambiguous cursor array in the probe trial (the “average shift”-
heuristic). A second heuristic assumed that subjects would always
use the standard trial policy associated with the largest possible
shift at the edge of the ambiguous cursor array in the probe trial
(the “biggest shift”-heuristic). A third heuristic was a mixture
between the two, always using the standard trial policy associated
with a shift halfway between the middle and the edge of the cur-
sor array. Especially, the first two heuristics provided very poor
explanations of the choice behavior, because they either systemat-
ically under- or overestimated the probability of choosing one of
the models. The “halfway shift”-heuristic achieved a negative log-
likelihood value that was only slightly higher than model selection
with Bayes factors, but the mismatch in the fits still seemed to
be systematically biased—see Figure 14. More importantly, the
question remains why any of these heuristics would be formed
and applied. As subjects did not receive any performance feed-
back in the probe trials, they could not have learned the heuristics
from trial and error.
Bayesian methods are typically used in two different ways in
psychophysical studies. They can simply be used as techniques
to analyze the data or they can be interpreted as processes that
might take place in a “Bayesian brain” that tries to make sense of
the world around it. Here we used different Bayesian and non-
Bayesian explanations to describe subjects’ choice behavior in a
model selection task. This does not necessarily have any impli-
cations as to which precise algorithm the brain might use to
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achieve this behavior. In fact, there are a number of methods
that have been suggested for the problem of model selection: the
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1974), the Schwarz
or Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978), mini-
mum description length (MDL) (Rissanen, 1978), Bayes factors
(Kass and Raftery, 1993; MacKay, 2003), structural risk mini-
mization (Vapnik, 1995), and regularization methods (Bishop,
2006). Model selection criteria like AIC and BIC can be con-
sidered as approximations to Bayesian model selection, but also
MDL, regularization and complexity measures in statistical learn-
ing theory can be related to the consideration of prior proba-
bilities in Baysian model selection (MacKay, 2003). Finally, how
model selection is achieved by neurons in the brain is subject to
neurophysiological investigation.
A key capability of biological organisms is to cope with an
uncertain environment. Uncertainty has many sources. It can
originate from noise in the nervous system (Faisal et al., 2008),
but also from uncertainty that arises in the face of ambigu-
ous stimuli. In dealing with uncertainty, Bayesian statistics have
proven to be a powerful and unifying framework not only in
cognitive sciences, but also in sensorimotor tasks (Körding and
Wolpert, 2006) and neural computation (Knill and Pouget, 2004;
Doya, 2007; Orban andWolpert, 2011). In particular, hierarchical
Bayesian models for inference and control might allow modeling
a variety of learning processes on multiple levels of abstrac-
tion (Haruno et al., 2003). Our task design provides a means to




Three female and four male participants were recruited from the
student population of the University of Tübingen. The study was
approved by the local ethics committee and all participants were
naive and gave informed consent. The local standard rate of eight
Euros per hour was paid for participation in the study.
MATERIALS
We used a virtual reality setup consisting of a Sensable
Phantom Premium 1.5 High Force manipulandum for track-
ing participants’ hand movements in three dimensions and an
NVIS nVisor ST50 head-mounted display (HMD) for creat-
ing stereoscopic 3D virtual reality—see Figure 15. Movement
position and velocity were recorded with a rate of 1 kHz. To
prevent very fast movements, the manipulandum was operated
with a weak isotropic viscous force field of f = αI3×3˙x, where
α = 0.04 Nscm , I3×3 is the identity and ˙x is the three-dimensional
velocity vector.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
A model selection problem can be characterized by a bivariate
distribution P(s,M) over a continuous random variable s and a
binary random variable M, where s plays the role of the model
parameter and M plays the role of the model. To study model
selection in a sensorimotor context, we designed a 3D visuomo-
tor task where participants had to move a cursor from a start
position to one of two targets, referred to as upper and lower
FIGURE 15 | Photograph of the experimental apparatus. The subject
operates a Sensable Phantom Premium 1.5 High Force manipulandum
and receives stereoscopic 3D visual feedback through an NVIS nVisor
ST50 head-mounted display.
target in the following—see Figure 1. During the movement, the
horizontal position of the cursor was shifted, and the shift was
generated by one of two possible statistical modelsM ∈ {M1,M2}
with 50:50 probability. Importantly, subjects were not informed
about the 50:50 probability. Each target corresponded to a model
M—the upper target corresponded to M1 and the lower target
corresponded to M2. The correct target was the one whose cor-
responding model M actually generated the observed shift in
any particular trial. The shifts were generated by first sampling
a model M and then sampling a shift from the shift-distribution
P(s|M). Since shifts were generated probabilistically, any shift
could in principle be generated by either model, however, with
different probabilities. There was only brief sensory feedback of
the shifted cursor during the movement. Participants had to use
this feedback together with their knowledge of the previously
learned statistical models P(s|M) to not only infer the shift s, but
also the model M. In these standard trials, participants reported
their belief P(s,M), where the shift s was indicated by a com-
pensatory horizontal movement when hitting a target, and the
belief about the model M was reported by choosing one of the
two targets.
In order to test for model selection in case of feedback uncer-
tainty, participants also experienced probe trials, in which they
only reported their belief P(M) = ∫ dsP(s,M) about the model
M. This was achieved by increasing the width of the targets
to cover the whole horizontal workspace, such that no hori-
zontal compensatory movements were necessary in these trials.
During the movement in probe trials, sensory feedback was
briefly shown in shape of arrays consisting of uniformly and
densely sampled rectangles that represented all the possible cursor
locations—see Figure 1B. Each probe trial had one of three possi-
ble feedback array sizes (small, medium and large) that occurred
equi-probably. Since the size of the feedback array constrained the
uncertainty about the possible shifts s, Bayesian model selection
required participants to “integrate out” different intervals of the
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parameter s when deciding on the model M by choosing either
the upper or lower target.
TRIAL SETUP
Each participant performed two parts of the experiment consist-
ing of 500 trials each. Before starting the experiment, participants
were informed about the relation between observing the horizon-
tal cursor shift and selecting one of the two targets. To start them
off in the first part of the experiment, they were told that small
shifts would be often associated with the upper target and larger
shifts mostly with the lower target—but they were also instructed
that they should use the first 100 training trials for learning this
relationship precisely. Similarly, they were told for the second part
of the experiment that small and very large shifts would be often
associated with the upper target and medium large shifts mostly
with the lower target. The initial 100 trials of each of the two ses-
sions were standard trials only. To keep participants motivated,
the hit ratio (in percent of the standard trials presented so far)
was displayed. In the following 400 trials standard and probe tri-
als were intermixed. For the probe trials, subjects were instructed
that there would be a whole array of little cursors any of which
could be the true cursor and that again they would have to decide
which one was the correct target just like in the standard trials,
but this time without knowing for sure which cursor was the cor-
rect one. The probability of presenting a probe trial was 0.45 if the
previous trial was a standard trial and 0 if the previous trial was a
probe trial. The second block of 500 trials was identical, only the
probability distribution over shifts of model M1 was broadened
to investigate the effect on the model selection process.
EXPERIMENTAL PRIOR DISTRIBUTIONS
Each model induced a different prior probability density P(s|M)
over the horizontal shifts s. In part one of the study, the two
models were a Gaussian and a bimodal mixture of Gaussians:
M1 : P(s|Mσ11 ) = N (0, 1 cm2)
M2 : P(s|M2) = 1
2
N (−2.5 cm, 0.25 cm2)
+1
2
N (2.5 cm, 0.25 cm2).
In part two of the study, the same distributions were used, only
the standard deviation of P(s|M1) was increased such that
M1 : P(s|Mσ21 ) = N (0, 16 cm2)
M2 : P(s|M2) = 1
2
N (−2.5 cm, 0.25 cm2)
+1
2
N (2.5 cm, 0.25 cm2).
The prior probability of both models was always P(M1) =
P(M2) = 12 . A plot of the prior distributions is shown in Figure 3.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE: STANDARD TRIALS
After hearing a beep, participants initiated a reaching movement
by controlling a cursor (red sphere, radius 0.4 cm) from a start
position (gray sphere, semi-transparent, radius 0.9 cm) to one of
two target blocks (yellow cuboids, height 5 cm, width 2 cm)—see
Figure 1A. One of the target blocks was in the upper half of the
workspace, the other target block was in the lower half—with a
distance of 2 cm in-between. Both target blocks were presented
at a depth of 18.5 cm with respect to the start position. Once the
cursor had left the start position, it was invisible and an additive
random shift was applied to the cursor position. The shift was
drawn from a distribution P(s|M) onceM had been sampled from
P(M). The correct target was determined by the sampled M, that
is the upper target was correct if M = M1 and the lower target
was correct if M = M2. While the cursor was invisible during the
movement, after amovement depth of 5.5 cm visual feedback (red
rectangle, width 0.8 cm, height 0.3 cm) of the shifted cursor posi-
tion was displayed for 100ms. When the movement exceeded a
depth of 18.5 cm the trial ended. If the cursor was in-between the
two targets without touching either of them, the trial continued
until one of the targets was chosen. For hitting a target, the cursor
had to at least touch the target block. When participants hit the
correct target, a high-pitch beep was played. When participants
hit the wrong target or missed the correct target, a low-pitch beep
was played. In either case the incorrect target disappeared. At the
end of the reach, the shifted cursor position was shown. If move-
ment was still in progress after 2 s, the trial was aborted and had
to be repeated.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE: PROBE TRIALS
In contrast to standard trials, the target width of the two tar-
gets was increased to 20 cm in probe trials, thereby covering
the entire horizontal workspace. Crucially, this made any com-
pensatory movements in the horizontal direction obsolete and
reduced the task to a binary model selection problem that only
required choosing either the upper or lower target. To further dis-
courage horizontal compensatory movements in probe trials, we
generated a “force tunnel” that did not allow left/right deviations
from the middle of the workspace, but only up/down and for-
ward/backward movements. Since sideward movements were not
necessary in probe trials, the impact of the tunnel force was barely
noticeable andmost participants reported that they did not notice
it at all when interviewed after the experiment.
Probe trials also started with a beep, after which participants
initiated a reaching movement to one of the two targets (yellow
cuboids, height 5 cm, width 20 cm)—see Figure 1B. At a move-
ment depth of 5.5 cm visual feedback was displayed for 100ms.
However, in contrast to the standard trials, feedback was not
shown as a little rectangle representing the shifted hand position,
but as an array of multiple same-sized rectangles that were sam-
pled simultaneously and uniformly from one of three possible
horizontal intervals: [−1.5, 1.5], [−2.5, 2.5], and [−4.0, 4.0] cm.
The little rectangles had 0.8 cm width and there were 4, 7, and
10 little rectangles, respectively shown for small, medium and
large bar size at any one time frame. The probability of showing
one of the array sizes was one third. Participants were informed
that this array indicated all possible cursor positions and that the
true cursor was at one of the many possible positions seen in
the array. Since sideward deviations were impossible due to the
tunnel force and vertical deviations carried no information with
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respect to possible shifts, the arrays were always centered in the
workspace both horizontally and vertically. In order to make par-
ticipants understand that the shift was sampled uniformly from
the cursor array, at the end of the movement, after participants
had chosen one of the two targets, a cursor position was drawn
from the uniform distribution over the shown interval and dis-
played. However, no visual or auditive feedback was given to
indicate whether the correct target was hit or not. The three possi-
ble widths for the interval (small: 3 cm, medium: 5 cm, and large:
8 cm) induced an increasing amount of uncertainty about possi-
ble shifts. In the probe trials we could therefore investigate how
these different amounts of uncertainty with respect to the param-
eter s affected the selection of the modelM, when the parameter s
was not reported and therefore could be “integrated out.”
MODELING
For the two Bayesian explanations of choice behavior in probe tri-
als, we used the following observation model. Crucially, in our
experiment observing an array of width d ≥ 0 is the same for
both models M1 and M2 and therefore the likelihood model only






if d ≥ 2|s| and d ≤ dmax
0 otherwise,
where dmax represents the maximum possible array width. In our
experiment dmax = 8 cm. This observationmodel implies that for
any given shift s, the array size cannot be smaller than s, since it
must contain s, and the array size cannot exceed the maximum
size dmax. All array sizes in-between have equal probability. After
observing array size d, Bayes’ rule allows us to infer the posterior





The Bayes factor can be derived from this posterior by real-
izing that P(d|M) = P(M|d) and P(M|d) = ∫ dsP(s,M|d). In
case of the Bayesian policy inference the posterior P(s|d)
can be derived from the joint posterior by realizing that
P(s|d) = ∑M P(s,M|d).
In line with Bayesian policy inference the posterior P(s|d) is
used for the probabilistic superposition of the standard trial poli-
cies P(a = M1|s) such that the choice probability in probe trials
is given by P(a = M1|d) =
∫
ds P(s|d)P(a = M1|s). The standard
trial policies P(a|s) were fitted to the data as follows. First, all
standard trials were sorted into five equidistant bins depending
on the magnitude of the shift in each trial. For the first part of
the experiment the five bins were [0, 1], [1, 2], [2, 3], [3, 4], and
[4, 5] cm. For the second part of the experiment the five bins were
[0, 2], [2, 4], [4, 6], [6, 8], and [8, 10] cm. The relative frequen-
cies of choosing model M1 in these bins was fitted by a sigmoid
psychometric function
P(a = M1|s) = 1 − 1
1 + e−s+ζθ
for the first part of the experiment and a two-partite sigmoid
function




for the second part of the experiment. The free parameters
ζ, θ, γ, δ, κ, τ were fitted by minimizing square error. The fits can
be seen in Figure 9.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This study was supported by the DFG, Emmy Noether grant
BR4164/1-1.
REFERENCES
Akaike, H. (1974). A new look at the
statistical model identification. IEEE
T. Autom. Control AC-19, 716–723.
Bishop, C. M. (2006). Pattern
Recognition and Machine Learning,
Vol. 4. New York, NY: Springer.
Braun, D. A., Aertsen, A., Wolpert,
D. M., and Mehring, C. (2009a).
Learning optimal adaptation strate-
gies in unpredictable motor tasks.
J. Neurosci. 29, 6472–6478.
Braun, D. A., Aertsen, A., Wolpert,
D. M., and Mehring, C. (2009b).
Motor task variation induces
structural learning. Curr. Biol. 19,
352–357.
Chen-Harris, H., Joiner, W. M., Ethier,
V., Zee, D. S., and Shadmehr, R.
(2008). Adaptive control of saccades
via internal feedback. J. Neurosci. 28,
2804–2813.
Diedrichsen, J. (2007). Optimal task-
dependent changes of bimanual
feedback control and adaptation.
Curr. Biol. 17, 1675–1679.
Diedrichsen, J., andDowling,N. (2009).
Bimanual coordination as task-
dependent linear control policies.
Hum. Mov. Sci. 28, 334–347.
Doya, K. (ed.). (2007). Bayesian Brain:
Probabilistic Approaches to Neural
Coding. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT
Press.
Ernst, M. O., and Banks, M. S. (2002).
Humans integrate visual and haptic
information in a statistically opti-
mal fashion. Nature 415, 429–433.
Faisal, A. A., Selen, L. P. J., andWolpert,
D. M. (2008). Noise in the ner-
vous system. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 9,
292–303.
Franklin, D. W., and Wolpert, D. M.
(2011). Computational mechanisms
of sensorimotor control. Neuron 72,
425–442.
Girshick, A. R., and Banks, M. S.
(2009). Probabilistic combination
of slant information: weighted aver-
aging and robustness as optimal
percepts. J. Vis. 9, 8.1–820.
Haruno, M., Wolpert, D. M., and
Kawato, M. (2003). Hierarchical
mosaic for movement generation.
Int. Cong. Ser. 1250, 575–590.
Holyoak, K. J. (2008). Induction as
model selection. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 105, 10637–10638.
Imamizu, H. (2010). Prediction of
sensorimotor feedback from the
efference copy of motor com-
mands: a review of behavioral
and functional neuroimag-
ing studies. Jpn. Psych. Res. 52,
107–120.
Izawa, J., Rane, T., Donchin, O., and
Shadmehr, R. (2008). Motor adap-
tation as a process of reoptimiza-
tion. J. Neurosci. 28, 2883–2891.
Kass, R. E., and Raftery, A. E. (1993).
Bayes factors and model uncer-
tainty. J. Am. Stat. Assoc. 90, 466.
Kawato, M. (1999). Internal models
for motor control and trajectory
planning. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 9,
718–727.
Kemp, C., and Tenenbaum, J. B. (2008).
The discovery of structural form.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 105,
10687–10692.
Kemp, C., and Tenenbaum, J. B.
(2009). Structured statistical models
of inductive reasoning. Psychol. Rev.
116, 20–58.
Knill, D. C., and Pouget, A. (2004). The
bayesian brain: the role of uncer-
tainty in neural coding and compu-
tation. TrendsNeurosci. 27, 712–719.
Körding, K. P., Beierholm, U., Ma,
W. J., Quartz, S., Tenenbaum,
J. B., and Shams, L. (2007).
Causal inference in multisensory
perception. PLoS ONE 2:e943.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000943
Körding, K. P., and Wolpert, D. M.
(2004). Bayesian integration in
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 291 | 15
Genewein and Braun A sensorimotor paradigm for Bayesian model selection
sensorimotor learning. Nature 427,
244–247.
Körding, K. P., and Wolpert, D. M.
(2006). Bayesian decision theory in
sensorimotor control. Trends Cogn.
Sci. 10, 319–326.
MacKay, D. J. C. (2003). Information
heory, Inference and Learning
Algorithms. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Nagengast, A. J., Braun, D. A.,
and Wolpert, D. M. (2009).
Optimal control predicts human
performance on objects with
internal degrees of freedom.
PLoS Comput. Biol. 5:e1000419.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000419
Newell, K. M., Liu, Y. T., and
Mayer-Kress, G. (2001). Time
scales in motor learning and
development. Psychol. Rev. 108,
57–82.
Orban, G., and Wolpert, D. M.
(2011). Representations of
uncertainty in sensorimotor
control. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 21,
1–7.
Ortega, P. A., and Braun, D. A. (2010).
A minimum relative entropy princi-
ple for learning and acting. J. Artif.
Intell. Res. 38, 475–511.
Poulet, J. F. A., and Hedwig, B.
(2006). The cellular basis of a
corollary discharge. Science 311,
518–522.
Rissanen, J. (1978). Modeling by short-
est data description. Automatica 14,
465–471.
Sato, Y., Toyoizumi, T., and Aihara, K.
(2007). Bayesian inference explains
perception of unity and ventril-
oquism aftereffect: identification
of common sources of audiovi-
sual stimuli. Neural Comput. 19,
3335–3355.
Schwarz, G. (1978). Estimating the
dimension of a model. Ann. Stat. 6,
461–464.
Shadmehr, R., and Mussa-Ivaldi, F.
(1994). Adaptive representation
of dynamics during learning of
a motor task. J. Neurosci. 14,
3208–3224.
Shadmehr, R., Smith, M. A., and
Krakauer, J. W. (2010). Error
correction, sensory prediction,
and adaptation in motor con-
trol. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 33,
89–108.
Smith, M. A., Ghazizadeh, A., and
Shadmehr, R. (2006). Interacting
adaptive processes with different
timescales underlie short-term
motor learning. PLoS Biol. 4:e179.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0040179
Tenenbaum, J. B., Griffiths, T. L.,
and Kemp, C. (2006). Theory-based
bayesian models of inductive learn-
ing and reasoning. Trends Cogn. Sci.
10, 309–318.
Tenenbaum, J. B., Kemp, C., Griffiths,
T. L., and Goodman, N. D. (2011).
How to grow a mind: statistics,
structure, and abstraction. Science
331, 1279–1285.
Tin, C., and Poon, C.-S. (2005).
Internal models in sensorimotor
integration: perspectives from
adaptive control theory. J. Neural
Eng. 2, S147.
Todorov, E. (2004). Optimality princi-
ples in sensorimotor control. Nat.
Neurosci. 7, 907–915.
Todorov, E., and Jordan, M. I. (2002).
Optimal feedback control as a the-
ory of motor coordination. Nat.
Neurosci. 5, 1226–1235.
van Beers, R. J., Sittig, A. C., and
Gon, J. J. (1999). Integration of
proprioceptive and visual position-
information: an experimentally
supported model. J. Neurophysiol.
81, 1355–1364.
Vapnik, V. N. (1995). The Nature of
Statistical Learning Theory, Vol. 8.
New York, NY: Springer.
Wallace, M. T., Roberson, G. E.,
Hairston, W. D., Stein, B. E.,
Vaughan, J. W., and Schirillo, J. A.
(2004). Unifying multisensory
signals across time and space. Exp.
Brain Res. 158, 252–258.
Wolpert, D. M., and Flanagan, J. R.
(2010). Motor learning. Curr. Biol.
20, R467–R472.
Wolpert, D. M., and Ghahramani, Z.
(2000). Computational principles
of movement neuroscience. Nat.
Neurosci. 3(Suppl.), 1212–1217.
Wolpert, D. M., Ghahramani, Z.,
and Jordan, M. I. (1995). An
internal model for sensorimo-
tor integration. Science 269,
1880–1882.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The
authors declare that the research
was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conflict of interest.
Received: 01 August 2012; accepted:
03 October 2012; published online: 19
October 2012.
Citation: Genewein T and Braun DA
(2012) A sensorimotor paradigm for
Bayesian model selection. Front. Hum.
Neurosci. 6:291. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.
2012.00291
Copyright © 2012 Genewein and
Braun. This is an open-access article
distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits use, distribution and
reproduction in other forums, provided
the original authors and source are
credited and subject to any copyright
notices concerning any third-party
graphics etc.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 291 | 16
